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Introduction 
 The aerospace industry is dependent upon safety for success. Without 
predictably safe operations, aviation travel would lack the trust and confidence of 
the public, causing revenue reductions, discontinued passenger routes, and 
cessation of some ancillary services. Aviation safety management systems (SMS) 
are tools that the industry uses to establish and maintain safety, predicting 
weaknesses and implementing remedial actions. SMS rely on an organizational 
culture of error reporting and safety-related processes that pervade every facet of 
planning, operations, and business structure all operating within a non-punitive 
atmosphere called a just culture (Darveau & Hannon, 2017; Dekker, 2014; Reason, 
1990). 
 Establishing the proper organizational culture is a prerequisite for a working 
SMS (Dekker, 2014). Building or remodeling company culture can be hindered by 
obstacles. There are human biases within every company that act as barriers to the 
establishment of the type of culture that supports the systemic implementation that 
SMS requires. These biases act as influential factors on the SMS, limiting its 
effectiveness. 
 
Background 
 Human biases can be overt and discriminatory, acting as illegal and socially 
unacceptable barriers to the foundation of safety culture (Jones, Arena, Nittrouer, 
Alonso, & Lindsey, 2017). Other biases can be subtle, resulting from cognitive 
evolutionary processes evolving over many thousands of years (Jones et al., 2017). 
These subconscious biases are thinking accelerators acting on human cognitive 
reflexes (Howard, 2017) being referred to as “system 1” type thinking, based on 
impulse and habit mechanisms devoid of most logical thought patterns (Liu, Vlesy, 
Fang, Denrell, & Chater, 2017). 
 Traditional solutions for dealing with human biases have included both 
education and recognition (Liu et al., 2017). These types of coping tools engage 
logical thought and have proven to have limitations (Derous, Buijsrogge, Roulin, 
& Duvck, 2016). This position paper offers an alternative method for engaging 
human bias and evaluates the potential of system 1 type thinking in dealing with 
system 1 type biases, improving the success of organizational culture necessary for 
SMS to flourish. This paper studies the application of a system called 
MINDSPACE (Liu et al., 2017) during the process of establishing company just 
culture. 
 Most traditional interventions against human biases employ logical thought 
and reflection, which are considered “system 2” thinking. Reducing human biases 
with “fight fire with fire” approach, matching system 1 solutions against reflexive 
biases in an aviation context, is the purpose of this paper (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Differences between system 1 and system 2 thinking in humans. 
Reprinted from ‘The pseudo-nuero science of business thinking…fast or slow, left 
or right, logic or emotion, system 1 or 2.’ Retrieved from 
https://www.thegeniusworks.com/2017/05/the-pseudo-neuro-science-of-business-
thinking-fast-or-slow-left-or-right-logic-and-emotion/. Copyright 2017 by Peter 
Fisk. 
 
 Current research has identified human biases as leading obstacles to 
efficient SMS function (Darveau & Hannon, 2017; Jausan, Silva, & Sabatini, 2017; 
Liu et al., 2017). Human biases often work contrary to corporate efforts intent on 
establishing cultures boosting SMS potency (Baybutt, 2016; Bellamy, Chambon, 
& Guldener, 2018; Derous et al., 2016; Emmons, Mazzuchi, Sarkani, & Larsen, 
2018; Gubbins, Harney, Vanderwerff, & Rosseau, 2018). Reducing the overall 
impact of these biases on the development of organizational safety culture with 
modern alternatives is the purpose of this paper.  
 Organizational culture is the fertile ground that permits SMS to be effective. 
Culture allows the establishment of the four pillars of SMS which are safety policy, 
risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion (Stolzer & Goglia, 2016). 
Establishing a culture that is open to and dedicated to developing these four safety 
concepts in the most primary step in the effective function of SMS. 
 
Statement of the Problem 
 Establishing a safety culture at the organizational level involves a 
commitment from the top leadership, appointment of a safety advocate, and 
adoption by upper- and mid-level divisional managers (Stolzer & Goglia, 2016). 
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 The problem is that human biases interfere with the establishment of culture, the 
primary step in establishing an effective SMS. 
 Mitigating human bias in real-world situations remains elusive, despite a 
saturation of research on human bias and its negative consequences on 
organizational efficiencies (Liu et al., 2017). The current body of research related 
to human biases supports the relationship of systemic bias with the presence of 
organizational barriers impeding the performance of SMS (Jausan et al., 2017). 
 Research identified four predominant human biases called anchoring bias, 
optimism bias, planning fallacy bias, and ambiguity bias (Emmons et al., 2018). 
Given the limitations of traditional strategies to effectively counter human biases, 
the MINDSPACE alternative system was evaluated to ascertain its potential impact 
to confront these four biases within the context of organizational decision making 
specifically related to establishing and maintaining a just culture. 
 
Review of the Relevant Literature 
History of Safety Management Systems 
 SMS are active within various industries. Many types of SMS have emerged 
within transportation industries to identify, manage, and preclude accidents 
(Naevestad & Hesjevoll, 2018; Ranney et al., 2018). The majority of SMS share 
certain characteristics in that they are structured, actively managed systems 
supported by leadership, designed to control risks, and prevent accidents (Li & 
Guldenmund, 2018). 
 Aviation SMSs began to evolve from the developed structure of quality 
management systems (QMS) emerging from mature businesses in the 1960s. 
Quality management has been a focus for goods manufacturers and proprietors for 
millennia, but the organized QMS emphasis on planning and building a quality 
system with repeatable processes along with measuring performance is considered 
the basis for modern aviation SMS systems (Stolzer & Goglia, 2016). Aviation 
SMS were developed over time as technical improvements combined with human 
factors studies and business-related QMS programs began to influence an organized 
approach to aviation safety (Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 2016). 
Purpose of the Aviation SMS 
 Aviation SMS success requires the identification of hazards, potential 
hazards, and management of risk. The FAA defines a SMS as “the formal, top-
down, organization-wide approach to managing safety risk and assuring the 
effectiveness of safety risk controls. It includes systematic procedures, practices, 
and policies for the management of safety risk” (2018, para. 1). The aviation SMS 
is a decision-making tool that is reactive and proactive in eliminating known and 
unknown risks, supported within an organizational culture that facilitates error 
reporting, dedicated to the continuing discovery of hazards (Dekker, 2014; Stolzer 
& Goglia, 2016). 
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  There are four fundamental, structural elements of an aviation SMS: safety 
policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion (Stolzer & 
Goglia, 2016). Each pillar of SMS may support sub-systems which can enhance 
effectiveness. The four elements are introduced below (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. The four main components of an aviation safety management system. 
Reprinted from (FAA, n.d). Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/about/ 
initiatives/sms/explained/components/ 
 
 Safety policy refers to the dedication by upper levels of management to 
provide a “just” culture in which unintentional mistakes are not punishable and 
error reporting becomes normal behavior. The just culture is a primary requirement 
for SMS to function properly because it provides objective information about root 
causes for mistakes which aid ongoing efforts to identify hazards and interrupt them. 
Barriers that prevent the establishment of a just culture will reduce the effectiveness 
of an aviation SMS (Baybutt, 2016; Bellamy et al., 2018; Darveau & Hannon, 2017; 
Dekker, 2014; Emmons et al., 2018). 
 Safety risk management is the second pillar of SMS and is related to the 
processes of hazard identification, risk identification and mitigation of both. Each 
company will have its own safety objectives, along with operational and financial 
constraints. This means that every safety risk management program for each 
aviation SMS will be structured differently. These risk management programs 
should not be thought of as pattern-type systems and each SMS must be evaluated 
and its performance measured on its own merits (Stolzer & Goglia, 2016). 
 Safety assurance is the third pillar of SMS and involves the actions 
necessary to verify that established hazard identification and risk management tools 
are acting effectively (Waddington, Lafortune, & Duffey, 2009). This part of a SMS 
deals with internal and external auditing, data collection, and performance 
measuring. A critical element of safety assurance is the constant inflow of objective 
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 error reporting data submitted through voluntary reporting systems (VRSs) 
(Robertson, 2016). Safety assurance is an important SMS function as it verifies that 
risks are being identified, mitigated and controlled. 
 Safety promotion is the final element of an SMS and is related to the top-
down management support of culture, safety education and mode of information 
sharing. Safety promotion also informs employees about the success of recent 
safety efforts to include the effectiveness of VRSs (Stolzer & Goglia, 2016). 
System 1 Versus System 2 Thinking 
 It is important to clarify the differences between system 1 and system 2 
thought processes since both are used as tools for reducing human biases. System 
1 thinking is impulse and habitually driven while system 2 deliberations are more 
logical and determined (Derous et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017). A system 1 bias 
example would involve an internal feeling of positive kinship between an applicant 
review board panelist and a job interviewee that comes from a similar educational, 
vocational, or geographical background. Given the same example, a system 2 
response would be to ignore those feelings of camaraderie and focus on written 
checklist tools, analysis processes, and performance-based criterion for judging 
purposes. 
 
Methodology 
Research Approach 
 This research was conducted as a comprehensive literature review to 
determine the extent of scholarly research involving human bias and how biases 
may impact the effectiveness of SMS. The research included the goal of discovering 
the most common barriers to an effective safety system, noting that most of these 
impediments included human bias in some form. All parts of the SMS were 
considered to include the safety culture, safety policy, safety risk management, 
safety assurance, and safety promotion. 
Design and Procedures 
 Numerous scholarly, peer-reviewed databases were consulted, emphasizing 
publications within the past three years. The systemic literature review resulted in 
the initial consideration of 86 sources, with the final source data emanating from 
references on human biases, organizational barriers, and remedies for counteracting 
biases having an impact on SMS effectiveness. 
Treatment of the Data 
 Survey data from multiple sources were collected regarding barriers to SMS 
effectiveness. The overall goal was identification of common themes in the data 
that represented the most common barriers to SMS effectiveness as recognized by 
transportation industry experts. This was accomplished by assigning barriers into 
categories. The categories were organizational, individual, and working 
environment. Sixty-two different barriers to SMS were identified across five 
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 studies. There were 29 organizational barriers, 18 individual barriers, and 23 
working environment barriers identified across all studies identified within the 
literature. Four barriers were included in all categories because they describe 
human biases that are applicable in some form across all types of organizational 
structures. As a result of organizational influences on safety culture, an emphasis 
on organizational barriers to SMS was chosen (Li & Guldenmund, 2018). 
 
Results 
The results from the literature review and subsequent data analysis revealed 
that human biases are systemic in the workplace. Within the aviation industry, 
human biases at the organizational level were discovered to have the most negative 
impact on establishing a just culture in which an SMS can effectively operate. The 
results also suggested that there are four biases that are predominant in propagating 
breakdowns in SMS effectiveness: optimism bias, planning fallacy bias, anchoring 
bias, and ambiguity bias. Results indicated that potentialities exist for deploying 
system 1 cognitive solutions within aviation businesses to combat human biases 
and strengthen the establishment of a strong just culture. The results also suggested 
that custom designed solutions may include both system 1 and system 2 approaches. 
Finally, the existence of a strong entrepreneurial culture may serve to inhibit the 
establishment of a safety just culture, especially if the owner(s) do not recognize 
the biases evident in their decision-making. 
Organizational Barriers are Important 
 Human biases at the organizational level were shown in the research to 
impact SMS effectiveness by impeding the establishment of a just culture (Darveau 
& Hammond, 2017; Emmons et al., 2018; Ioannou et al., 2017; Jausan et al., 2017; 
Naevestad et al., 2018). A just culture requires an objective corporate mindset intent 
on constructing an atmosphere of trust which fosters voluntary error reporting 
(Darveau & Hammond, 2017). The data showed that when human biases are 
permitted to exist, or are used in decision-making, certain vulnerabilities in a just 
culture can be created. Some of these weaknesses are managerial self-protection 
mechanisms, protection of status, overconfidence, overt discrimination, and 
resistance to change (Baybutt, 2016; Bellamy et al., 2018; Dekker, 2014; Derous et 
al., 2016; Howard 2017). Moreover, since these biases exist at the organizational 
level and due to their negative impact on the development of a just culture, biases 
must be recognized, managed, and controlled. 
 Two general schools of thought emerged within the research aimed at 
reducing optimism bias, planning fallacy bias, anchoring bias, and ambiguity bias 
at the organizational level: system 1 and system 2 based cognitive solutions. 
Traditional Solutions are Ineffective 
 Liu et al. (2017) noted the ineffectiveness of standalone system 2 cognitive 
solutions. System 2 thinking seeks to recognize that human biases exist and “de-
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 bias” the decision-making process (p. 135). Liu et al. argued that system 2 solutions 
attempt to rationalize instinctual, rapid impulse decision-making (system 1), and is 
therefore not compatible with strategizing solutions to system 1 biases. 
 The entirety of the data included in this report also supported the concept 
that the sole use of system 2 cognitive tools aimed at reducing human biases is not 
effective. Prima facia evidence for this conclusion abounds since there is evidence 
that despite the deployment of system 2 tools, human biases remain pervasive 
(Jones et al., 2017; Malos, 2015). 
 
MINDSPACE – A New Framework 
The MINDSPACE framework offers relatively new potential for managing 
human biases. MINDSPACE seeks to motivate human behavior by altering the 
context of the decision-making process so that system 1 cognition is more aligned 
with organizational culture (Liu et al., 2017). This is accomplished by “using one 
bias to overcome another bias” versus “changing the mind” (pp. 136-137). 
MINDSPACE attempts to motivate human behavior by manipulating responses to 
impulsive and habitual cognitive reflexes. 
The MINDSPACE system is based on a book called The Nudge and was 
originally proposed by Dolan et al. (2010) to the government of the United 
Kingdom in analyzing how governmental policy changes may impact human 
behavior. Since that time, use of the MINDSPACE approach has widened, 
spreading into pharmacological (O’Sullivan, Ryan, Downey, & Hughes, 2016), 
healthcare (Vlaev, King, Dolan, & Darzi, 2016), and industrial settings (Liu et al., 
2017). Based on its continued success and adoption by other industries, 
MINDSPACE shows promise for aviation applications.  
The MINDSPACE nine system 1 interventions and brief explanations are 
shown below: 
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Table 1 
MINDSPACE Acronym and Definitions 
(M) Messenger People are influenced by who communicates 
information 
(I)  Incentives Human beings have mental shortcuts to prevent “losses” 
(N) Norms People are strongly influenced by what others do and 
what is considered normal behavior 
(D) Defaults People tend to stick with pre-determined options 
(S) Salience What is unique and relevant draws human attention 
(P) Priming Human behavior is influenced by “subconscious cues” 
(A) Affect Emotional associations can be powerful human 
motivators 
(C) Commitments We honor public commitments and tend to reciprocate 
acts 
(E) Ego Humans act in ways that protect, preserve the self 
Note. Adapted from Dolan et al., (2010). MINDSPACE: Influencing Behavior 
Through Public Policy, p. 6. 
 
The core element of the MINDSPACE approach is that it uses one of, or a 
combination of, the above nine interventions to alter the context of the decision-
making process to align system 1 solutions with system 1 type problems (associated 
with human biases in this case). 
 MINDSPACE can benefit companies aiming to establish just cultures as a 
basis of effective SMS. Strategizing with MINDSPACE may be both creative and 
scientific processes, with final solutions aimed at initial corporate and internal error 
reactionary measures being more about safety, efficiency, and performance, rather 
than punishment. 
 Each of the MINDSPACE interventions are listed below, but only briefly. 
They are shown in italics when referencing a specific MINDSPACE letter. The 
reader should use this basic information to further their knowledge about 
MINDSPACE and system 1 interventions, especially within aviation applications. 
Messenger 
 People attach meaning to information disseminated by those that are 
considered experts of knowledgeable. The messages often act as an anchor, 
especially when listeners may not be well-versed about a particular subject. The 
significance of the messenger within the context of MINDSPACE is that the 
message may be manipulated to achieve the desired human behavior. If objectivity 
is crucial, then anonymity should be promoted and only the message itself delivered. 
In establishing a just culture at the organizational level, messengers have significant 
influence over the strength of the overall impact of the efforts (Dolan et al., 2010). 
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 Incentives 
 Most human beings will go to great lengths to avoid financial and or social 
losses. Incentives is a powerful MINDSPACE interdiction as it allows planning 
around many of the shared characteristics that the aviation industry shares with 
other business segments: competition, product and services promotion, business 
health and success, personal career growth, and other factors. Planners may utilize 
this “fear of losses” to guide thinking to more closely parallel organizational goals. 
This intervention may assist company leaders with establishing just cultures 
because most people tend to avoid punishment and reciprocate respectful behavior 
(Dekker, 2014). 
Norms 
 Most people do not enjoy being categorized as outside of being “normal.” 
Past research has indicated that people will go to great lengths in avoiding being 
labelled as abnormal or existing outside of normal behavior. 
 The use of norms can be a powerful tool when establishing a safety culture. 
This strategy may act as a leverage point (and combine with other MINDSPACE 
interventions) for top leadership to persuade mid-level managers to accept the new 
culture and support it. Another possibility is to establish teams of employees across 
all operational divisions that can participate, contributing ideas to culture 
development but through a well-designed input mechanism intended to elicit 
acceptance of the final product. This would also involve the use of commitments, 
the C in the MINDSPACE framework. The planned participation of all employees 
signals management’s readiness for across the board input, engaging in “normal” 
face to face interactions and a new way of doing business (Liu et al., 2017). 
Defaults 
 People do not enjoy changing selections, especially when it involves 
possible losses. Organizational leaders should utilize MINDSPACE to establish 
culture-related default policies that encourage adoption of just cultures. This may 
involve establishing internal, decision-making roadmaps that require a certain 
number of managers agree (or disagree) on a topic. This process then becomes the 
default way of making decisions throughout the organization. 
 Utilizing defaults to enhance aviation just cultures can include many things 
such as using automatic generation of anonymous user accounts for VRS log in as 
part of the onboarding process for new employees. This default setting allows 
everyone within the organization to have an anonymous account, followed up by 
human resources’s training on the use of and effectiveness of VRSs. Within the 
organization, other default policies are available and may include pilot and crew 
shuttles that utilize hotels without all- night clubs attached (to reduce temptations 
to drink alcohol late in the evening). The ideas are limitless, involve changing the 
context (not the mind) and involve specific organizational goals. 
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 Salience 
 Salience is a MINDSPACE intervention that acts on a human being’s 
evolutionary impulse to anchor information. Salience makes us choose things 
because they are deemed important or critical to a process or simply because the 
object, idea or policy is more noticeable and available. An example of salience is 
the successful increased sales of milk versus soda in a cafeteria due to milk being 
placed more directly in front of young consumers and soda being placed farther 
away. This is the concept of salience. 
 Salience can be useful in establishing just cultures when strategists use it to 
manipulate influences to overcome established or “old” ways of doing things. 
While the traditional punishment for errors may be monetary, a reprimand or even 
employment termination, salience keeps the focus on the determination of root 
causes and determination of hazards (Liu et al., 2017). 
Priming 
 Priming means that as people, we often base our decision-making on 
subconscious ques that are beyond the scope of the issue at hand. Despite having 
years of experience in human biases, judges have higher conviction rates when the 
weather is bad. This type of system 1 process is difficult to correct because even if 
identification of such behavior is available in research, it still exists and recorded 
as systemic. 
 Priming may impact the establishment of just cultures by encouraging 
leadership to respond negatively to any policy changes resulting in a loss of income 
(this could also be part of incentives). To counter priming and encourage acceptance 
of the just culture, the context of the situation could be altered to show the benefits 
to the company’s competitiveness and attractiveness toward previously 
unidentified market segments. By altering the context way from finances, the focus 
is shifted toward stability and potential growth (Jones et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017). 
Affect 
 Affect involves human emotions. Results that have negative emotional 
impact tend to be avoided. The FAA recognizes the impact that affect has on new 
students undergoing flight training. In the Aviation Instructor’s Handbook, the 
FAA discusses the Law of Effect: “Thus, learning is strengthened when 
accompanied by a pleasant or satisfying feeling, and (sic) weakened when 
associated with an unpleasant feeling” (FAA, 2008, p. 2-11).  
 Affect is a core argument against punishing accidental errors. Internal 
policies should reflect as much positive emotional support and reaction as possible 
when establishing just cultures, especially if there is a transition necessary to 
achieve it. Moving from the traditional ways of “doing things around here” to a 
vibrant, forward thinking just culture may create negative emotional responses 
from some. There should be a strategy to guide and manage those feelings. 
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 Commitments 
 People normally honor public commitments and reciprocate good behavior 
(Liu et al., 2017). Strategist for just culture development should note that 
commitment becomes even more successful when costs of failure becomes elevated 
(Dolan et al., 2010). In developing just culture, it is important to obtain firm 
commitments from messengers and other managers to support and promote the 
changes. Public commitments to the just culture would be most effective, especially 
when linking the lack of commitments to loss (as in a loss of business to a 
competitor). 
Ego 
 Ego means that people act in ways that tend to elevate themselves. Ego is a 
complex subject, as the term also includes ancillary situations and conditions with 
which the ego interacts. People contemplate their own behavior and performance 
as being superior to others, when the opposite may be true. Ego is a powerful 
heuristic that may be combined with other MINDSPACE interventions to create 
novel solutions. Ego may be problematic when establishing a just culture that 
enhances SMS effectiveness. To counter ego, the context must be changed so that 
ego is acted “with” in developing solutions to just culture implementation (Dolan 
et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2017). An example of utilizing ego to organizational 
advantage would be to recognize work efforts based on their contribution to the 
culture, rather than their personal achievements. 
MINDSPACE and Optimism Bias 
Optimism bias can reduce an organization’s attempts at establishing the just 
culture necessary for an effective SMS. Optimism bias creates the illusion that one 
is at a reduced risk of experiencing and having to deal with the consequences of a 
negative event, compared to peers. When CEOs and upper level managers are 
influenced by this bias, they may propagate that invulnerability into the culture 
planning process, assuming that existing risk identification and management 
programs are effective “enough” (Emmons et al., 2018). Optimism bias may be 
strengthened by a clean accident record and result in dangerous complacency. 
Optimism bias may influence corporate leaders to skip safety meetings and 
participation in safety-related activities. Crafting a custom MINDSPACE approach 
against optimism bias would depend on the details of each situation. In general, 
leaders must be “obsessed” with safety in such a way that it becomes the norm for 
the organization (National Transportation Safety Board, 2013). 
Another MINDSPACE approach to counter optimism bias is to engage in 
“devil’s advocate” (Baybutt, 2016) type behavior, highlighting the potential for 
realistic personal losses (paychecks), damage to corporate reputation (stability of 
the company), and questioning of leadership (stability of management) occurring 
as the result of accidents and poor safety culture. By highlighting the possible 
methods and consequences of failure, system 1 thinking is engaged via realization 
11
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 that this behavior is outside of safety “norms: and providing “incentives” to avoid 
personal and financial losses. 
It is important when utilizing MINDPACE as a tool to combat biases, that 
exaggeration be avoided so that participants do not evaluate the system as a “scare 
tactic” or extreme measure. Company-wide, management accepted goals should be 
evaluated for MINDSPACE solutions with real-word, believable outcomes that 
build trust in the MINDSPACE system because it is aligned with overall 
organizational goals. 
Engaging MINDSPACE to minimize optimism bias when establishing (and 
maintaining) a just culture means having a system 1 program in place to 
consistently remind culture designers that the company is statistically vulnerable to 
negative events. This understanding should be the catalyst for healthy and more 
ingenious hazard and risk analyses and mitigation measures during the 
establishment of just culture itself. MINDSPACE recognizes that there are inherent 
hazards and risks in the establishment of potential solutions in that the answers are 
susceptible to biases in design, construction and implementation. 
MINDSPACE and Planning Fallacy Bias 
Planning fallacy bias involves underestimating resources required while 
overestimating the benefits (Emmons et al., 2018). When the task is establishing a 
just culture, planning fallacy may have deeply negative consequences for longer-
term SMS effectiveness. For example, consider that leadership is working to 
establish a VRS as part of a non-punitive just culture that proactively encourages 
error disclosures. If a strong message is not broadcast from the CEO (the 
messenger), the promotion of safety is seen as delicate and ethereal. The 
unquestionable dedication of leadership to the establishment of just culture is 
paramount because it acts on the instinctive reflex to believe or not to believe the 
messenger, the head of the company (a system 1 process).  
To support the establishment of a just culture and to aid in combating 
planning fallacy, organizations should consider establishing working teams to 
default to a risk adverse position automatically. For example, if a helicopter work 
crew is working on a live electrical conductor, any member of the crew should have 
the authority to stop the entire work process at any time and discuss the issues with 
no penalties in benefits (pay or working hours). This default to safety represents 
support of the just culture from an organizational level and builds trustworthiness 
with employees that “safety is the norm.” Use of the default mitigation tool also 
assists in alleviating the planning fallacy bias by recognizing the error in resources 
allocation and effectiveness of procedures, even if it is during a work process. 
MINSPACE and Anchoring Bias 
Anchoring bias causes people to base conclusions on certain data points that 
may be factual or non-factual or on previous experiences (Darveau & Hammond, 
2017). These anchors can form as a result of a messenger (individual or company 
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 policy), partial information, or a static culture that promotes the idea of circular 
logic like this is the way we have always done it around here and if it’s not broken, 
don’t fix it. Baybutt (2016) noted that anchoring may lead to a type of group or herd 
mentality that precludes innovation and organizational improvement. 
For aviation companies, anchoring bias can result in complacency that is a 
key enemy, impacting safety and profitability at the same time (Darveau & 
Hammond, 2017). Sometimes, the anchoring can result from a lack of information. 
In these particular cases, a system 1 approach to combat anchoring would be to 
develop systems through which intelligence is gained about competition. This 
information about competitors would provide a steady stream of new information 
which would combat anchoring bias and would act on the system 1 cognitive reflex 
to “protect” corporate homeland and its customers (incentives, salience, ego) 
(Dolan et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2017). 
Although the topic could be mentioned in other sections of this report, the 
discussion about anchoring bias seems an appropriate time to mention the strong 
influence of entrepreneurs. Small to mid-sized companies can be especially 
vulnerable to the strong leadership styles of entrepreneurs who may bypass normal, 
internal company processes established to guarantee best case business practices. 
This strong anchoring effect can lead others in leadership positions to accept this 
influence and make allowances that retard safety and the establishment of a just 
culture. 
An example of entrepreneurial influence on a just culture would occur if a 
business owner directly hires a friend in a safety-sensitive position, bypassing 
normal hiring defaults and processes. An entrepreneur sought to limit safety 
oversight through a political connection in 1995, which resulted in a charter plane 
crash, killing three doctors (Brasher, 1995). Since aviation entrepreneurs have legal 
powers as business owners, they can be dangerous catalysts for excessive risk-
taking and just culture failures. 
MINDSPACE and Ambiguity Bias 
Ambiguity bias (or effect) is related to the identification of “high 
consequence, low probability” events that are beyond a decision-maker’s control 
or breadth of knowledge (Emmons et al., 2018, p. 64). Ambiguity bias occurs when 
decisions are made on limited data in favor of known probabilities for favorable 
outcomes. People tend to avoid choosing an outcome that has limited information. 
Employees will tend to ignore, or refuse to participate in just cultures with 
complicated policies or systems, choosing the status quo over a new, more 
ambiguous method of operations. 
Impeding ambiguity when setting up just cultures can be facilitated with use 
of the MINDSPACE intervention strategies. The key to the ambiguity bias is clarity 
and clarity demands information. Just cultures should have clear, well-explained 
policies that treat participants equally and are transparent. Voluntary reporting 
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 systems (VRSs) should be anonymous and thoroughly explained from system 
architecture to collection of data and final disposition of reports. Strategists may 
choose any number of MINDSPACE combinations to achieve these outcomes.  
When combatting ambiguity bias, it may be especially useful to maintain a 
high level of transparency in order to facilitate trust in the just culture. The use of 
messengers and incentives could accomplish transparency by providing feedback 
about every VRS error report. The emphasis on positive outcomes for VRS 
reporting would also provide salience to just culture operations by reinforcing trust 
by providing transparency and real-life corporate benefits to just culture 
implementation. Scheduling different members of management and labor discuss 
these outcomes would also provide an element of ego, further reinforcing adoption 
of non-punitive thinking. 
 
Conclusions 
 Systemic human biases impede objective decision-making at organizational 
levels, acting as barriers to establishing just cultures. The most common human 
biases at the organizational level identified in this research were optimism bias, 
planning bias, planning fallacy bias, and ambiguity bias. Various strategies exist 
for managing biases that act as barriers to just culture, a pre-requisite for effective 
aviation SMSs. Two different approaches are normally referenced when dealing 
with the impact of human biases: system 1 and system 2 solutions. 
 System 1 solutions are countering mechanisms that are based on heuristics, 
a human-based evolutionary process that has resulted in impulse and habit-based 
cognitive shortcuts designed to process decisions rapidly. System 2 thinking is 
thought of as being the “traditional” basis of solutions to human biases and involves 
the rational and deliberate aspects of human deliberation.  
 The purpose of this paper was to identify and advocate a system 1 
methodology that may assist in countering human biases that act as barriers to the 
establishment of just cultures and effective aviation SMS systems. MINDSPACE 
was identified in the research as a system comprising of nine, bias mitigation tools. 
MINDSPACE may be useful within the aviation industry in reducing the amount 
of human biases that impede the establishment of just culture. 
Many examples could be made regarding the use of MINDSPACE within 
the decision-making organizational process associated with creating a just culture. 
No previous research was able to be identified that considered the use of 
MINDSPACE in dealing with human biases as they pertain to aviation just culture. 
The author hopes that this intentionally superficial treatment of the subject will 
motivate others to conduct additional research in evaluating how system 1 cognitive 
tools may positively impact just culture and overall aviation SMS function. 
As the aviation industry begins to experience the changes associated with 
NextGen, additional tools should be deployed, assisting in motivating human 
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 behavior toward safety and efficiency. MINDSPACE has proven its ability to 
counter human biases in other industries and should prove helpful, not only in 
benefiting just culture, but should have applications in aviation hazard and risk 
identification and management. 
Although MINDSPACE has been shown to successfully counter human 
biases in a number of industries, this research uncovered cautionary opinions 
regarding system 1 thinking. Some sources were concerned that system 1 
alternatives (including MINDSPACE) artificially manipulate human behavior, is 
too paternalistic and may have fleeting impacts on reduction of biases. Another 
concern is that strategists must be well-trained in the application of system 1 
solutions and intensely creative in the design of tools, given a particular situation 
(Dolan et al., 2010). 
Despite the concerns above, MINDSPACE and system 1 tools offer a 
possible wide-spread humanitarian solution for bias reduction in that the approach 
is not expensive and may be adopted anywhere and anytime. This potential for 
widespread use offers those with lower levels of education an opportunity to 
participate in solutions and the amelioration that system 1 solutions offer. 
It should also be noted that no research considered by this project promoted 
the sole use of system 1 or system 2 thinking as solutions excluding one another. 
Most research advocated a combination of system 1 and 2 solutions as having more 
noticeable and lasting impact on the totality of organizational culture (Derous et al., 
2016; Dolan et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2017). 
 
Recommendations 
The body of research collected for this project identified the role of human 
biases as barriers to establishing aviation just cultures, inhibiting the effectiveness 
of safety management systems. Additional research should pursue scientific studies 
to more thoroughly define methodology for incorporating MINDSPACE system 1 
tools into the aviation industry.  
During this research, consistencies were noted between the FAA’s 
discussion on human behavior in the Aviation Instructor’s Handbook (FAA, 2008) 
and potential system 1 and 2 biases interventions. Additional analyses beyond this 
project has the potential to explore the FAA’s research in human behavior, learning 
and communication as useful information for system 1 and 2 behavioral planners 
within the aviation industry.  
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